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Abstract
The historical trajectory of electoral process in the 
post colonial Nigeria is characterised by violence. In 
fact, recent manifestations of electoral violence, most 
importantly since the birth of the Fourth Republic in 1999 
have assumed an unprecedented magnitude and changing 
form, resulting in instability in democratic consolidation 
as well as the loss and displacement of many innocent 
lives. The paper historicizes electoral violence and its 
implications on the survival of democracy in the Nigeria 
with major emphasis on the Fourth Republic. It argues 
that the high incidence of electoral violence (pre and post) 
in the Fourth Republic in particular is closely associated 
with neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian state, 
the nature and kind of party politics being played, the 
weak institutionalisation of democratic architectures and 
inefficient electoral management body among others. It 
posits that these were among the factors that led to the 
fall or collapse of the First and Second Republics. The 
paper therefore submits that the survival of democracy 
in the Fourth Republic involves adherence to the ideals 
and principles of electoral process as practised in ideal 
democratic societies.
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In every stable democratic society, election remains 
the essential ingredient of transitory process from 
one civilian administration to another. Elections have 
become an integral part of representative democracy 
that by and large prevails across the world. According to 
Lindberg (2003), every modern vision of representative 
democracy entails the notion of elections as the primary 
means of selection of political decision makers. Thus, it 
is incomprehensible in contemporary times to think of 
democracy without linking it to the idea and practice of 
elections. Ojo (2007), described election as the ‘hallmark 
of democracy’ while Chiroro (2005) sees it as the ‘heart 
of the democratic order’. In all, elections constitute a core 
component of democracy.
The electoral process in Africa in general and Nigeria 
in particular especially since the beginning of the 21st 
century is characterised by violence. It is important to 
emphasize here that though violence has been a long-
standing feature of the democratisation process in the 
post colonial Nigeria, its recent manifestations especially 
since the birth of the Fourth Republic has assumed an 
unprecedented magnitude thus constituting a major threat 
to the survival democracy. Fundamentally, there is no 
doubt the fact that electoral violence remains a major 
source of political instability in a democratic society with 
palpable threats of deconsolidation. Scholars among which 
were Adigun Agbaje and Said Adejumobi have argued that 
violence has become infused in political processes in most 
new democracies in Africa especially with respect to the 
21st century. For instance, according to the 2008 Amnesty 
International Report, ‘the violent struggle for power, even 
in states which do not descend into armed conflict, still 
remains an important component of political life in Africa.
Nigeria,  having survived decades of mili tary 
dictatorship which was characterized by despotism, 
violation of fundamental human rights, financial profligacy 
among others, eventually returned to democratic rule on 
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May 29, 1999 which culminated in the birth of the Fourth 
Republic. The republic which started amidst great hope and 
expectations is yet to significantly convince the generality 
of the Nigerian populace its democratic success especially 
with respect to the conduct of free, fair and credible 
elections devoid of election violence (pre and post). 
In fact, both at national and state levels, transition 
from one civilian administration to another since 2003 
in particular has been very rough. This is noticeable in 
the various cases of electoral violence which has claimed 
several lives, displacement of innocent people and 
wanton destruction of property. The conduct of election 
since the birth of the fourth republic up to 2011 has been 
retrogressive rather than progressive. This work tends to 
interrogate electoral violence and the survival of democracy 
in Nigeria through historical approach. For the purpose 
of this discourse, the paper is divided into six parts. The 
first part is the introduction; second focuses on conceptual 
clarification; third deals with historical trajectory of 
electoral violence in Nigeria; the fourth part discusses 
electoral violence in the fourth republic; the fifth part 
examines electoral violence and the survival of democracy 
in the fourth republic while the sixth part is the conclusion. 
1.  CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF 
SOME TERMINOLOGIES
In a discourse of this nature, it is very imperative to 
conceptualize some major key concepts. Among these 
concepts include, violence, electoral violence, election 
and democracy. First, the word violence has been viewed 
from different angles by different scholars from distinctive 
standpoints. Thus, for the purpose of this discourse, we are 
looking at violence in terms of both violation of human 
rights and social injustice. This paper therefore examined 
one major type of violence (electoral violence) that has 
greatly led to loss of lives, wanton destruction of property, 
massive displacement of innocent lives as well as threat to 
the survival of democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
1.1  Violence
According to Gilula & Daniels (1969) as cited in 
Wikipedia (2010), violence is ‘destructive aggression’. 
This conceptualization of violence implies the use of 
physical force to injure persons or property; and this is the 
core of most definitions of violence. The World Health 
Organization defines violence as the intentional use of 
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting 
in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or 
deprivation (WHO, 2002).
1.2  Election
Webster’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2006) defines 
election as: “the act or process of organizing systematic 
(s) election (permitting mass participation and method of 
choosing) a person or persons by vote for a public office 
position in which state authority is exercised”. Roberts 
and Edwards (1991) cited in Omotola (2007) define 
election as: “A method for the selection of persons to fill 
certain offices through choices made by an electorate; 
those (citizens who are qualified to vote under the rules 
and procedures of the electoral system”
1.3  Electoral Violence
Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence (conflict) as any 
random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or 
otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, 
verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical 
assault, forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of 
property, or assassination. Fischer’s definition has been 
modified by Megan Reif (2010) as cited in Majekodunmi, 
R & Adejuwon, K.D (2012) where electoral violence is 
defined thus: 
any spontaneous or organized act by candidates, party 
supporters, election authorities, voters, or any other actor 
that occurs during an electoral process, from the date of voter 
registration to the date of inauguration of a new government, 
that uses physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, 
violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other 
coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, 
hastening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an 
electoral process and its outcome. 
Also, Igbuzor (2010) sees electoral violence as: 
any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political 
activities, including pre, during and post election periods, and 
may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force 
to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or 
the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other 
electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person 
connected with electoral processes. 
International Foundation for Election Systems (2011) 
defines electoral violence as “any violence (harm) or 
threat of violence (harm) that is aimed at any person or 
property involved in the election process, or at disrupting 
any part of the electoral or political process during the 
election period.” 
According to Albert (2007) electoral violence has to 
do with all forms of organized acts or threats – physical, 
psychological, and structural – aimed at intimidating, 
harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, 
during and after an election with a view to determining, 
delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process.
These above definitions of electoral violence typically 
captured the deeper nature and stages of electoral violence 
in Nigeria especially since the birth of the Fourth Republic 
in 1999.
1.4  Democracy 
Democracy which started in Ancient Greek city state 
Anthen was derived from the Greek words “Demos” 
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meaning “people” and “Kratos” implying “rule”. Thus 
when put together, democracy in Ancient Greek means 
“rule by the people (Cambridge Encyclopaedia 1990). 
More importantly, while there is no universally accepted 
definition of democracy, Dahl et al (2003) cited in 
Abimbola & Adesote (2012) argued that equality and 
freedom remain the most important characteristics of 
democracy since ancient times. They however defined 
democracy as an egalitarian form of government in which 
all the citizens of a nation together determine public 
policy, the laws and the actions of their state, requiring 
that all citizens (meeting certain qualifications) have an 
equal opportunity to express their opinion (Abimbola & 
Adesote, 2012).
2.   HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA
The history of political violence (electoral violence 
inclusive) in Nigeria could be traced to the colonial period. 
This means that thorough understanding of the problem 
of electoral violence in Nigeria requires situating it within 
its political history. Scholars have argued that colonial 
settings laid the foundation of future political conflict 
in Nigeria. This argument was hinged on a number of 
British political experiments in West Africa in general and 
Nigeria in particular among which were, the introduction 
of the elective principle in 1922 and on the emergence of 
the 1946 Richards constitution. For instance, the elective 
principle, though to a very large extent was non-violent, 
was too limited with income and residential qualifications, 
could be a potential basis for violence (Omotola, 2007). 
This argument could be corroborated with what 
happened when elections were held into the regional 
Houses of Assembly in 1951 across the country. The 
elections which were held based on the then electoral 
system introduced by the 1951 constitution led to 
widespread dissatisfaction among majority of Nigerians 
in 1952. Thus, in 1953, there was increase in the 
intensity of political agitation (Falola, et al, 1991). The 
1946 constitution paved the way for the division of the 
country into three regions in which each region was 
dominated by a major ethnic group. For example, the 
Hausa-Fulani dominated the Northern region, while the 
Yoruba and the Igbo dominated the Western and Eastern 
regions respectively. Thus, within each region, there 
were numerous other so-called minorities which were at 
a considerable disadvantage as far as political power was 
concerned. The emergence of political development in 
1950s marked the genesis of electoral violence in Nigeria. 
In 1951 for instance, elections were held into the regional 
Houses of Assembly based on the introduced electoral 
system of the 1951 Constitution. This electoral system 
created a widespread dissatisfaction among the Nigerians 
(Falola et al, 1991). 
The first and immediate post independence electoral 
violence in Nigeria occurred during the 1964 general 
elections, the first election to be conducted after 
independence. The Northern People’s Congress needed the 
elections to consolidate its power at the centre. The Action 
Group (AG) also needed it in order to dislodge Chief S.L 
Akintola from power in the West. The NCNC on its own 
also wanted to improve its bargaining strength in the East. 
It became obvious that all the major political parties were 
adequately anxious to participate in the elections (Falola 
et al, 1991). By the middle of 1964, two major political 
alliances had emerged from all the manoeuvres. The NPC 
and the NNDP founded the Nigerian National Alliance 
(NNA). The AG and the NCNC constituted themselves 
into the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The 
1964 federal election was contested between these major 
alliances (Ige, 1995). Two main coalitions contested these 
elections: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) made 
up of the NPC and some other minor parties; the United 
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) comprising the 
NCNC, AG, NEPU and UMBC (Falola, et al, 1991). 
The campaigns by these coalitions generated much 
bitterness, acrimony and violence, especially in the west. 
The elections which were said to have been massively 
rigged through different means lead to widespread 
violence/conflicts in the west following the announcement 
of results by the Chairman of Federal Electoral 
Commission in person of Mr. Esua. This argument could 
be corroborated with the address of president Azikiwe 
and the then Inspector General Police, Mr. Louis Edet. 
Azikiwe in his Dawn broadcast to the nation, expressed 
the head of state condemned the way and manner the 
electioneering was conducted and his disappointment. The 
politicians in power have no right to employ instruments 
of power in order to perpetuate their stay in office. The 
president cited instances where Nigerian citizen had 
been deprived of their constitutional right to freedom 
of association. He warned the politicians that: “If they 
have decided to destroy our national unity, they should 
summon a round table conference to decide how our 
national asserts should be divided for it is better that we 
should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces” (Anifowose, 
1972). In a similar view, the inspector general of police, 
Louis Edet made a nation-wide broadcast reporting 
that incidents involving violence had reached alarming 
proportions. He appealed to the politicians to protect 
Nigeria’s enviable reputation as a bastion of democracy in 
Africa (Anifowose, 1972).
The attendant violence, including arson, looting, 
killing, wanton destruction of properties and the total 
collapse of public order especially in the western region, 
was unprecedented. For example, at Ishokun, Ilesha, 
twenty school children were murdered on the ground that 
they were in town to combat an impending riot. Also, at 
Isho, a village few miles from Owo, sixteen people were 
killed. As it was in the west, so also it went on in the 
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Middle Belt. A good example was the second Tiv riot of 
1964 (Anifowose, 1972). 
The last straw that broke the camel’s back was the 
elections into regional assembly in the west in October 
1965. The announcement of the election results by the 
Federal Electoral Commission, which led to the victory 
of Chief S.L Akintola of the Nigeria National Democratic 
Party (NNDP) as against the wishes of many people 
who expected that Chief Adegbenro of the UPGA led to 
large-scale widespread violence in the whole of western 
region on the ground that there were irregularities in the 
election results. The decision of the federal government to 
recognize the election thus gave Chief Akintola the power 
to form a new government. This however made UPGA 
to embark on a spontaneous and violent demonstration 
known as “operation wet e” – an operation which required 
the spraying of houses, cars and persons with petrol and 
then setting fire to them (Ige, 1995). There were series of 
protests and demonstrations carried out by angry students, 
market women, farmers and other groups in most towns 
and villages throughout the western region, and these 
were accompanied by looting, arson, killing on an 
unprecedented scale and burning of houses, vehicles and 
shops. Anti-governmental placards were displayed, party 
slogan- Awo! Awo! UPGA! UPGA! -as well as war songs 
were advanced. In some cases, the demonstration ended in 
clashes with anti-riot police squad, who did not hesitate to 
shoot. A typical song by the angry demonstrators was “E 
jeki a mura ogun, eleyi l on je iya (let us prepare for war, 
this is an insulting behaviours) (Anifowose, 1972). The 
high rate of electoral violence (pre and post) following 
the 1964 and 1965 elections were said to have contributed 
in no small measure to the collapse of the first Republic 
(Osaghae 1998; Akinwumi 2004).
The electoral process of the second republic (1979–
1983) was equally led to various cases of electoral 
violence across the whole of Nigeria. The most important 
one was the second election that was conducted after the 
first administration in 1983. The structure of politics, 
despite the alteration in the structure of the federation 
from three (and later four) regions of the first republic, to 
nineteen states, was still largely driven by ethno-religious 
forces, where each party maintained its stronghold in a 
given regional/ethnic domain (Omotola, ). For example, 
the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) dominated the 
Northern region, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) 
dominated the Western region while the National Council 
of Nigeria Citizen (NCNC) dominated the Eastern region 
(Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). The National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), obviously NPC’s successor, controlled 
the federal government between 1979 and 1983. In the 
1983 elections, it wanted to extend its reach to other 
regions, either by hook or by crook. The attempt to 
achieve this underscored the massive rigging of the 1983 
elections, which resulted in an unprecedented outbreak 
of violence in the Western region, where the Unity Party 
of Nigeria (UPN), AG’S successor, held sway (Omotola, 
2007). In the then Oyo and Ondo States, the two UPN 
states were declared for the NPN. This announcement 
led to unprecedented violence, in which a writer simply 
described it as ‘the house of war’ (Barbarinsa 2002). 
Although Ondo state was later returned to UPN at the 
Election Tribunal, series of violence that accompanied 
the disputed election results following various cases of 
alleged irregularities in the conduct of the election led 
to the collapse of the second republic; thus giving the 
military the opportunity to seize power on 31 December 
1983.
This discourse would be incomplete without having 
a look at the aborted Third Republic. Prior to the 
Presidential election in 1993, the local government and 
gubernatorial elections had already been conducted in 
preparation for the birth of the third republic. It is known 
fact that Nigeria since independence has never had any 
peaceful election devoid of violence and other electoral 
vices. Thus, the 1992/1993 elections were no exception. 
Meanwhile, the circumstances that led to the aborted Third 
republic revealed that Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, a dictator, 
in spite of his long transition programme, had no intention 
of handing over power to the civilian. This became known 
when he annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election 
which was internationally acclaimed as free and fair; and 
as well described by local observers as the fairest election 
in the post colonial Nigeria. The annulment of the election 
caused series of crises especially in the Western part of 
Nigeria championed by some groups such as NADECO 
among others. The post electoral violence which followed 
the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election was what 
forced Gen. Ibrahim Babangida to form an Interim 
National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan, 
who was later overthrown in what was regarded as 
peaceful coup on November 17 1993 by General Sani 
Abacha. This development made the Third Republic an 
aborted republic (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).
The above historical analysis of the electoral violence 
in the post colonial Nigeria in particular contributed 
immensely to reasons why democracy in the first two 
major republics (first and second) could not only be 
consolidated but also be sustained. It could also be argued 
that the electoral processes as well as the kind of party 
politics (popularly known as zero sum game, winner takes 
all syndrome) played in the two republics were parts of 
the reasons why democratic rule could not be sustained. 
3.  ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE 
FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1999-2011
Before we begin to examine various cases of electoral 
violence that have plagued the fourth republic since 1999, 
it is important to briefly have a glimpse of the birth of 
the republic. The process that eventually culminated in 
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the birth of the Fourth Republic began as a result of the 
sudden death of Late Gen. Sanni Abacha on June 8, 1998, 
thus paving for the emergence of General Abdulsalam 
Abubakar as the new Head of State of Nigeria. Subsequent 
upon his emergence, Gen Abdulsalam announced that 
he would hand over power to the democratically elected 
president on May 29, 1999. In the pursuance of the 
transition programme, General Abubakar, dissolved the 
initial five political parties registered by the Abacha’s 
regime, cancelled all the elections that were conducted and 
thus, set up another electoral body known as Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC). The electoral 
body was set up initially to grant provisional registration 
to nine political parties, with the condition that after the 
local government elections of that year, those that had 
10% votes and above in at least 24 states of the Federation 
would qualify to contest the subsequent State and Federal 
elections. Eventually, only three political parties that is, 
the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples Party (APP) 
and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that were registered 
(Dode, 2010 ; Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).
Within nine months of inception, the regime of Gen. 
Abdulsalam successfully completed a transition to civilian 
administration by conducting several elections including 
the presidential election of April 1999 and thus handing 
over power to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP 
on May 29, 1999. The emergence of Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo as the third executive president of Nigeria 
of marked the genesis of the fourth republic. The need 
therefore to nurture the nascent democracy to maturity 
such that it could no longer be reversed or eroded like 
what happened during second republic became a major 
challenge to the new government. 
The conduct of free, fair and credible periodic 
elections by unbiased electoral body including its umpire 
as well as other electoral officials and the adherence to 
democratic principles of governance remain major factors 
responsible for the avoidance of electoral violence in any 
democratic society. These two major factors were the 
challenges which the fourth republic had been contending 
with since its birth in 1999 up till 2011 general elections. 
It is against this backdrop that we shall examine various 
electoral violence vis-à-vis elections that were conducted 
in Nigeria since the birth of the fourth republic with major 
emphasis on the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections.
Since the birth of the fourth republic in 1999, three 
general elections were said to have been conducted under 
a civilian administration in the country in which one can 
say that democracy was actually consolidated. In other 
words, the years between 2003 and 2011 witnessed the 
successful transition of one civilian administration to 
another. For instance, in 2003, a presidential election was 
conducted and the incumbent president, Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo of the PDP was declared the winner by INEC. In 
2007, Late Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua of the same PDP was 
also declared by INEC as the President elect. In April 2011, 
another presidential election was conducted by INEC in 
which Dr. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP, who was initially 
sworn in first as, Acting President following the critical 
condition of Late president Umaru Yar’Adua, and later as a 
substantive President after its death also contested and was 
declared winner of the election by INEC. 
Though democracy was consolidated in the period 
between 2003 and 2011 because, there was no military 
welcome back, various elections conducted during the 
period were not devoid of different kinds of electoral 
malpractices which led to a number of electoral violence 
culminating in the killings and displacement of many 
innocent lives and destruction of property which worth 
billions of naira. Effort would be made to cite various 
cases of electoral violence that took place in Nigeria 
between 2003 and 2011.
It has always been argued that one of the fundamental 
problems facing majority of post-colonial African states 
is that of how to sustain and consolidate their democracy 
through credible elections (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1989). 
Evidences have shown that in the whole of African 
continent, only few states could lay claim to have 
genuinely conducted free and fair elections that were 
universally perceived. Thus, election administration that 
will achieve governmental legitimacy and as well prevent 
electoral violence after polls has always been a major 
serious concern to not only electoral scholars (Kolawole, 
2007), but also many lovers of democracy. It is on this 
submission that the three general elections that were 
conducted in Nigeria stands.
The first major general election to be conducted by 
a civilian administration in Nigeria’s fourth republic 
was in 2003 under the administration of President Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo. The 2003 general election was 
not only said to have been one of the most corrupt and 
fraudulent elections to be conducted in the post colonial 
Nigeria (Kurfi, 2005). The election was also characterised 
by different types of electoral frauds which range from 
ballot stuffing, intimidation, killing, and assassination 
among others. The election was a triumph of violence. 
A number of people have argued that there were no 
elections in 2003 but merely the intimidation of voters 
and the selection of already decided winners by elites and 
caucuses (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Both internal and 
external observers were unanimous on the unfairness of 
the competition in the electoral process which was said 
to have been manipulated by the so-called ruling party, 
Peoples’ Democratic Party. For example, according to 
the Human Right Watch’s report, between April and May 
2003, about one hundred people were said to have been 
killed and many more injured during federal and state 
elections in Nigeria and that most of the violence was 
perpetrated by the ruling PDP and its supporters (Human 
Rights Watch, 2004). The subsequent local government 
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election which was conducted across the country in the 
following year also witnessed electoral violence. USIP 
noted that violence during the 2003 election cycle was 
more blatant and widespread and marked the unchecked 
proliferation of another worrisome development; the hiring 
and arming of militias to serve narrow political ends. 
Also, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), 
a coalition of over ninety civil society groups, in its 
report on the 2003 general elections, gave a vote of no 
confidence in the elections. The group declared in its 
report that “…Twenty-nine of the registered political 
parties that either contested or did not contest the elections 
have variously rejected the results as announced by the 
INEC declaring the results as fraudulent. Both Domestic 
and International Election Observers documented massive 
irregularities that characterised the elections and refused 
to endorse the elections as free and fair. Some political 
parties and their candidates decided to challenge some of 
the results before the various Election Petition tribunals 
and have gone ahead to do so while others declared 
“mass action” to pressure a government without popular 
mandate to abdicate power” (TMG,2003). This could 
be corroborated with the submission of Agbaje and 
Adejumobi (2006), who argued that the electoral fraud 
that was staged in 2003 general elections was more 
sophisticated than that of 1983 general elections. 
In 2007, the second election under the fourth republic 
was conducted. Rather than getting better, in spite of 
series of negative reports by both internal and external 
observers against the 2003 general elections, the 2007 
general elections turned out to be the worst election to 
have been conducted in the post colonial Nigeria. In 
the run-up to the elections, there were several incidence 
of pre-electoral violence leading to political killings, 
bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival 
political parties. Evidences showed that between June 
and August 2006, about three gubernatorial candidates 
were assassinated (Omotosho, 2007) among which Dr. 
Ayo Daramola, PDP gubernatorial candidate of Ekiti 
State was among.
The outcome of the general elections of 2007 was said 
to be flawed elections. In fact, election was worse than 
the 1999 and 2003. The scale of electoral violence (pre 
and post) was unprecedented. Good examples of cases of 
pre-electoral violence in the 2007 election are captured by 
IFES-Nigeria and the Human Right Watch. For instance, 
the IFES-Nigeria collected, documented and reported 
different incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria, 
and thus put the total at 967, which included 18 deaths 
from January 13 – April 30 2007 (IFES-Nigeria, 2007). 
The Human Rights Watch also highlighted incidence of 
pre-electoral violence in the run-up to Nigeria’s April 
2007 elections which was beset by political killings, 
bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival 
political factions (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Instances 
of irregularities in the conduct of the election which 
invariably engendered electoral violence were noticeable 
in the recourse to courts by aggrieved parties as well as 
the reports of various local and foreign observers, electoral 
scholars and even in the speech of elected president.
Animashaun (2008), argued that there was massive 
irregularities in the 2007 general elections and it was 
characterised by inflation of voting figures, declaration 
of result where elections were never held or not 
conclusive, intimidation of voters as well as manipulation 
of the security services. According to former governor 
of Anambra State, Dr Chukwuemeka Ezeife, while 
commenting generally on the status of democracy in 
Nigeria as cited in Adeyemo (2009) opined that:
...democracy is associated with elections. How have the elections 
gone since 1999 till date? The 1999 elections were disputed 
but it was vastly better than the 2003 elections. People shouted 
foul about the 2003 election but that was infinitely better than 
the non election of 2007. Each election has been worse, more 
flawed than the one before it. We cannot be getting a democracy 
by running further away from it.
Late President Umaru Yar’Adua also at his inaugural 
speech admitted that the 2007 general elections were 
flawed (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). The evidence of this 
was seen in the various steps he took subsequently after 
its assumption. First, he inaugurated twenty-one members 
of Electoral Reform Committee, headed by justice Uwais 
to see to the problem of electoral process in the country. 
Second, he ensured the Independence of Judiciary which 
was noticeable in the various judgements dispensed 
at both Tribunal and Appeal courts over electoral 
irregularities. Examples of this were the loss of Edo, Ekiti, 
Osun and Ondo States to Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN) and Labour Party respectively (LP), which were 
initially declared to have been won by PDP according to 
INEC (Aniekwe, et al, 2011)). 
Though the 2011 general elections were generally 
acceptable by both local and foreign observers to be 
partially fair when compared with the 2003 and 2007 
general elections which conducted under the fourth 
republic, the election witnessed two major stages of 
electoral violence, the pre-election period (that is, period 
of registration, campaign, election day) and the post 
election period (that is, after the announcement of results). 
At the state level, there were several cases of pre-electoral 
violence which led to the brutal murder of some people. 
A good example of this was the case of pre-electoral 
violence in Akwa Ibom state in March 22, 2011 which 
led to the setting up of Presidential Investigation Panel 
to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the 
violence and proffer solutions to nip future occurrence in 
the bud and the way forward. According to a report, some 
parts of the Akwa Ibom state, particularly in Ikot Ekpene 
and Uyo were engulfed by a reign of violence which was 
unprecedented. Thus, by the time the dust of the mayhem 
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settled, according to officially confirmed Police report 
two supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 
Etop Nicholas Idiong, a trader and Daniel Udo Akpan, a 
commercial motorcyclist were brutally murdered in Ikot 
Ekpene while several people sustained various degrees 
of injuries. Also, Nsemo Ita Ekong, an Akwa Ibom 
Transport Company bus driver was recovered shot dead 
in his vehicle on Abak road and several persons were 
injured in Uyo. Other loses suffered included property 
worth billions of Naira which were destroyed during the 
politically motivated rampage. The property included: 200 
brand new Peugeot 307 cars; 500 brand new tricycles; 
the Goodluck/Sambo Campaign office which was burnt 
down by the rampaging mob; Fortune International High 
School owned by Senator Aloysius Etok which was razed 
down with school children in session and over 20 Toyota 
Hiace buses belonging to the PDP and Godswill 2011 
Campaign Organization, nine Hilux jeeps belonging to 
the Government of Akwa Ibom State which were either 
completely destroyed or vandalized (Official Gazette of 
Government of Akwa Ibom State, 2012).
At the national level, the announcement of the April 
2011 Presidential election result by INEC in which 
President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP was declared 
the winner led to violence (post electoral violence) 
especially in some parts of Northern Nigeria, such as 
Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, Kaduna among others. The 
post electoral violence that accompanied the 2011 general 
election resulted in the killing of about ten corps members 
in Bauchi state (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Beside 
this, there were other cases of electoral violence over the 
2011 election. It was a result of the magnitude of the pre-
election violence in Akwa Ibom State and the mayhem 
that had rocked several parts of the country before and 
after the April 2011 general elections that compelled 
President Goodluck Jonathan to set up a 22-man panel 
under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ahmed Lemu to 
look into the various crises. Specifically, the Panel was 
mandated to identify those responsible for the pre-election 
violence in Akwa Ibom State as well as the other electoral 
violence that greeted the election especially in some 
Northern states in the country.
4.  ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND THE 
SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA’S 
FOURTH REPUBLIC: LESSONS FROM 
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES
The place of free, fair and credible election in the 
sustenance of democracy most importantly in a democratic 
society cannot be overemphasized. This is because, it 
not only offers a government a unique opportunity for 
legitimacy, but, also serves as a transitory process in 
stable democracies. This is why electoral scholars like 
Adigun Agbaje, 2006, Shola Omotola, 2007 among 
others often argued that the significance of fair and fair 
elections as a critical element of democracy cannot be 
overstated. Besides, in a liberal democracy, electoral 
process always gives room for the formation of groups 
popularly called political parties which are expected to 
possess some basic characteristics like political ideology, 
sincere political manifestoes, party discipline, strong 
internal democracy among others (Abimbola & Adesote, 
2012). Thus, competition among these political parties 
is seen as part and parcel of democracy because it helps 
to strengthen the quality and level of their service to the 
people. It is when politics is not being played according 
to the acceptable democratic principles that it generates 
into unprecedented violence.
Historically, the use of violence (pre and post) 
in elections is not peculiar to recent and emerging 
democracies in developing world in general and Africa in 
particular. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries England and America, there were documented 
cases of electoral violence where force and intimidation 
were used as a tactical means of winning elections 
(Seymour C, et al, 1918). One basic fact remains that 
violence in elections has always been a major threat to 
the sustenance or stability of a democracy. With respect 
to African continent, new democracies in this continent 
especially since the 1990s which was termed as the third 
wave of democracy have been confronted with series of 
electoral violence that had resulted in the killing/death 
and displacement of many innocent lives. Examples of 
this are noticeable in the cases of Zimbabwe, 2000, 2005, 
2008; Zanzibar 2005, 2010; Kenya, 2007, among others 
(Chaturvedi, 2005, Khadiagala 2008, Waki Report 2008, 
and USIP, 2010). For example, the 1998 elections in 
Lesotho led to a post—election conflict nearly brought 
the country to a civil war situation. This situation was 
only contained through the diplomatic and military 
interventions of South Africa and Botswana. In 2007, 
the elections were similarly accompanied by violence 
(Matlosa, 2007). Also, the disputed presidential elections 
in 2007 in Kenya threw her into a post—election violence 
which, in only two months, claimed more than 1200 lives 
and displaced an estimated 350,000 people (USIP, 2010).
More importantly, high degrees of conflict or 
continuous electoral violence are capable of creating 
political unrest and as result instability; and slow the 
sustenance and consolidation of democracy as well as 
development. This could be seen in what happened in 
some of the countries in African mentioned above. For 
instance, an analysis by Afrobarometer of Africans’ 
view of democracy suggests that poor elections are to 
blame for dissatisfaction with elections as means to 
attain political representation. Thus, among the eighteen 
countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, the three countries 
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where elections have been relatively free of violence—
Ghana, Botswana, and Namibia—are the most satisfied 
with elections as a means to engage the government. On 
the other hand, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia, where 
elections have been more violent and controversial, are 
the least satisfied (Afrobarometer, 2006). The implication 
of this lack of satisfaction is democratic instability. A 
good example of this was the case of Cote d’ Ivoire in 
the 2011/2012 presidential elections between the then 
incumbent president, Gbagbo and the current president, 
Alassane Quattara . 
The above examples of several cases of electoral 
violence in some countries in Africa and how it had 
threatened the consolidation and sustainability of their 
democracy should serve as big lessons to Nigeria 
especially as she prepares for 2015 general elections. The 
notion that “better a sham election than no election at all” 
for the purposes of ensuring the continuity of democracy 
as well as the view that worst civilian government is 
better than the best military regime should not be taken 
for granted. This could be dangerous.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discourse has critically examined electoral 
violence and the survival of democracy in Nigeria’s 
fourth republic from the historical perspective. The paper 
argues that one of the major factors that was responsible 
for the fall and collapse of the first and second republics 
in the post colonial Nigeria was massive electoral 
irregularities which led to unprecedented electoral 
violence. It discusses several cases of electoral violence 
since 1960 up till the birth of the fourth republic. The 
discourse posits through the historical perspective that 
the Nigerian politics since independence have been 
characterised by pervasive struggle for political control 
irrespective of their negative consequences. 
Despite the fact that the most recent electoral exercise 
in the country, the April/May 2011 general elections and 
the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Edo and Ondo States 
showed elements of improvement and possibly restoration 
of hope in the democratization process which was though 
applauded by foreign observers, the elections especially 
the April 2011 presidential election led to post-election 
violence. The paper submits that, for democracy to survive 
in Nigeria there is need for building the institutional 
capacity of the electoral commission, comprehensive 
and broad based electoral framework, constant and 
frequent political education and enlightenment. Electoral 
competition should not be seen as a do or die affairs 
as championed by former President, Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo during the run-up to the 2007 general election. 
A good lesson should be learnt from the just concluded 
presidential election in Ghana, a neighbouring West 
African country where though the competition was keen, it 
was devoid of ethnic chauvinism and religious sentiment.
It concludes that the survival of democracy as well 
as its consolidation involves adherence to the ideals 
and principles of electoral process as practised in ideal 
democratic societies (Schedler, 1998). Also, moving a 
step further towards completing and deepening democracy 
is measured by high expectations of regime continuity 
(Schedler, 1998). Thus, the attainment of these objectives 
involves three core elements of structural, behavioural 
and attitudinal foundations of democratisation (Schedler, 
2001). While the structural elements emphasise issues 
of socio-economic prosperity where poverty is kept to 
the barest minimum and institutional parameters such as 
periodic, competitive, free and fair elections, a multiparty 
system and the rule of law, the behavioural foundations 
relate to the proven capacity of ‘democrats’ to roll back 
anti-democratic challenges. This demands that no major 
political actors violate basic democratic rules anymore 
(Schedler, 2001), by having recourse to electoral violence, 
the rejection of elections or the transgression of authority, 
thereby putting the survival of democracy at great risk. 
The third element is the attitudinal foundations that 
encompass what Andreas Schedler called the basic 
normative, strategic and cognitive elements required 
to sustain democracy. The normative elements include 
democratic legitimacy, defined as the genuine, non-
instrumental, intrinsic support for democracy by political 
elites as well as citizens. The strategic elements entail the 
ability to mediate in and transform the usual conflicting 
relationship between democrats and anti-democrats in a 
consensual way, so that all can work in the interests of the 
democracy project (Schedler, 2001).
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